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THE RULE OF LAW AND OBEDIENCE TO LAW 
Colleen Murphy* 
PAUL GOWDER, THE RULE OF LAW IN THE REAL WORLD (CAMBRIDGE 
UNIVERSITY PRESS 2016). PP. 285. HARDCOVER $125.00. PAPERBACK 
$34.99. 
In The Rule of Law in the Real World, Paul Gowder engages three audiences: legal 
scholars and philosophers interested in the concept and normative value of the rule of law, 
political scientists interested in measuring and empirically assessing the degree to which 
societies meet its demands, and development scholars aiming to cultivate the rule of law 
in contexts where it is currently absent or minimally present. Gowder covers an impressive 
range of materials from across disciplines, and his synthesis of different strands of thought 
about the rule of law is brilliant. After providing a brief summary of Gowder’s positive 
account, I question one assumption underpinning his argument. 
Gowder defends a version of the rule of law that consists in three basic principles: a 
principle of regularity (which requires officials in their conduct and action to adhere to a 
reasonable conception of what declared legal rules permit and prohibit, especially in the 
coercive use of state power);1 publicity (which requires the rules on the basis of which 
officials will respond to the conduct of legal subjects to be made known to legal subjects 
in advance, be justified or justifiable to them, and be open to contestation by those subject 
to coercion).2 These first two principles constitute the weak version of the rule of law and 
provide safeguards against two kinds of threats: hubris (in which officials act coercively 
towards subjects without offering any reason for the basis of their actions, and in this way 
treat legal subjects as their inferiors not warranting any explanation);3 and terror (in which 
the conditions under which officials use coercion is not made known to citizens in advance 
and so subjects are not put in a position where they can reliably determine what actions to 
take to avoid coercive treatment).4 These two conditions, Gowder argues, are mutually 
reinforcing.5 This minimal version does not place demands on the substantive content of 
law; it does not entail respect for rights and is compatible with unjust articulations of the 
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 1. PAUL GOWDER, THE RULE OF LAW IN THE REAL WORLD 12–15 (2016). 
 2. Id. at 15–18. 
 3. Id. at 19–20. 
 4. Id. at 20–22. 
 5. Id. at 13. 
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conditions under which coercion will be exercised.6 The third condition, which transforms 
the rule of law from its weak to strong version, is a principle of generality (which requires 
laws to treat legal subjects equally, or as equals).7 Gowder specifies the demands of 
generality as a demand to satisfy the constraints of public reason.8 The explanation of the 
purpose of a particular regulation must appeal to reasons for those asked to obey, 
legislators, as well as the broader community. Such reasons cannot hinge on the 
subordinate status of some relative to others to explain why a given rule obtains.9 Together, 
these principles constitute the rule of law as an egalitarian ideal, structuring relationships 
of vertical equality (between legal subjects and officials) and horizontal equality (among 
citizens).10 
After articulating these three principles, which he notes can be met to different 
degrees and which do not require any specific institutional arrangement, Gowder goes on 
to show how ancient Athens and contemporary Britain fared according to the criteria 
articulated above.11 He then considers the conditions under which the rule of law will be 
stable and under which it can be cultivated in contexts where it is absent.12 Stability turns 
on equality in Gowder’s view; to the extent that a legal system satisfies the generality 
condition it is stable in part because of the commitment to the rule of law this generates.13 
Similarly, generating the rule of law is a function of generating commitment to law as the 
way in which interaction between citizens and officials and among citizens will be 
structured, as well as fostering control of the use of force by the state among other 
conditions.14 
Like all theories, Gowder’s account has a certain set of starting points and basic 
assumptions that orient his theory. I focus in my critical remarks on one: rejecting the 
claim that the rule of law requires obedience on the part of citizens. 
A consistent commitment of Gowder’s is that the demands of the rule of law are 
demands on officials or those individuals or groups who exercise state-like power.15 His 
hesitancy to include any obligation of obedience on the part of citizens is based in part on 
his understanding of the source of the problem to which the rule of law is a solution.16 The 
law, in Gowder’s view, is a safeguard against tyranny and the tyrannical use of the power 
of the state to oppress and unjustly use violence against those subject to its power.17 This 
is why the rule of law constrains officials in their exercise of power. Moreover, demanding 
that citizens obey the law risks putting citizens in a position where they are being asked to 
submit to their own oppression, rather than putting them in a position to contest state power 
                                                          
 6. GOWDER, supra note 1, at 13–19. 
 7. Id. at 28–41. 
 8. Id. at 33–41. 
 9. Id. at 35–40. 
 10. Id. at 40–41. 
 11. GOWDER, supra note 1, at 97–141. 
 12. Id. at 161–67. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 171–72. 
 15. Id. at 143–67. 
 16. GOWDER, supra note 1, at 143–67. 
 17. Id. at 51–52. 
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and its abuse. This implication would potentially undermine the notion that the rule of law 
is a moral good.18 
However, Gowder’s concerns seem to rely on an overly simplistic view of how we 
should conceptualize any requirement of obedience on the part of citizens. It is possible 
for an obligation to obey the law to be conditional in nature. One may have an obligation 
to obey the law, conditional in part on what government officials do. To the extent that 
government officials fail in their obligations to adhere to the requirements of the rule of 
law, they undermine the conditions on which any obligation of obedience on the part of 
citizens depends. As Lon Fuller, who defends the claim that there is an obligation to obey 
the law, notes: 
[T]here is a kind of reciprocity between government and citizen with respect to the 
observance of rules. Government says to the citizen in effect, “These are the rules 
we expect you to follow. If you follow them, you have our assurance that they are 
rules that will be applied to your conduct.” When this bond of reciprocity is finally 
and completely ruptured by government, nothing is left on which to ground the 
citizen’s duty to observe the rules.19 
One of the places Gowder defends the claim that obedience to law on the part of 
citizens is not what the rule of law requires is in his discussion of lynching in the United 
States. He references the case of Willie James Howard, whose killers were never 
prosecuted and whose grave went unmarked. His case, like others, Gowder claims, tells us 
about the instrumental complicity of state authorities in private racial terror, allowing 
Whites to take individuals from jail, impeding chances of prosecution for those implicated 
in lynching, and participating in lynching in certain cases. Officials were instrumentally 
complicit in the sense that “at those rare moments where local officials actually tried to 
put a stop to the lynchings, they largely succeeded.”20 He concludes: 
The rule of law is a condition to be established by and through the state, and by 
limiting the rule of law critique to a critique of the state’s behavior, we enable 
ourselves to see what the state did distinctively wrong in handling the lynchings: it 
withdrew its protections unequally from Black citizens.21 
In my view, the picture Gowder describes of lynchings overstates the independence 
of the power of the state from citizens, and, relatedly, it ignores the importance of the 
willingness of citizens to obey the law for the rule of law itself. To see its misleading 
character, let me consider another case, that of Sam Hose, a twenty-one-year-old Georgian 
who was lynched in 1899.22 Sam Hose was lynched for killing his White employer, Alfred 
Cranford, and allegedly raping his wife Mattie in their home after an altercation.23 
Following the murder and alleged rape, Hose fled the town of Palmetto, Georgia.24 Local 
newspapers ran stories about the murder and rape, writing that when Hose was caught he 
                                                          
 18. Id. at 52. 
 19. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39–40 (1964). 
 20. GOWDER, supra note 1, at 54. 
 21. Id. at 55. 
 22. PHILIP DRAY, AT THE HANDS OF PERSONS UNKNOWN: THE LYNCHING OF BLACK AMERICA 3–17 (2002). 
    23. Id. at 7. 
    24. Id. at 9. 
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would be killed or burned at the stake and warning law enforcement not to interfere with 
“the people’s will” by protecting Hose from the lynch mob.25 Given the gravity of the 
case, articles stated, the people could not be expected to wait until law enforcement and 
the courts weighed in.26 Along with this narrative, pictures of Hose were published as well 
as details of a substantial financial award, compiled by contributions from newspapers and 
wealthy businessmen as well as the governor for Hose’s capture.27 As in the case Gowder 
considers, police failed in their investigation, not going to the crime scene to gather 
evidence and only talking to the close friends and family of Cranford.28 
What matters for my purposes is the manner in which Hose was eventually captured 
and what transpired between his capture and brutal death. Hose had fled to his mother’s 
home, seventy-five miles away from the town of the murder.29 Eventually the owners of 
the farm on which his mother stayed, brothers J.B. and J.L. Jones, learned of Hose’s 
presence and, aware of the reward, arranged with another farm worker to lure Hose to a 
party where he was apprehended.30 The farm owner tried to disguise Hose prior to going 
on a train so that he could be delivered to law enforcement officials as the terms of the 
reward required.31 En route, a passenger recognized Hose.32 At a particular stop, sheriffs 
from two counties were waiting.33 They, Jones, and railroad company representatives 
decided that a special train would be used for the remainder of Hose’s journey.34 One 
hundred fifty unofficial, armed escorts went on that special train.35 When the train arrived 
at Newman, dozens more men were waiting.36 Sheriff Joseph Brown and Jones were 
worried about the mob and agreed that they would escort him to the jail, at which point 
Jones would collect the award, and then Hose would be subsequently turned over to the 
lynch mob.37 However, as he was being marched to the prison, the mob turned on the 
sheriff, pointing a pistol at the sheriff and demanding that Hose be turned over to them 
immediately.38 The march to the final destination where the mob eventually lynched Hose 
took time, during which trains arrived carrying spectators who had come after Sunday 
mass to witness the lynching.39 All told, 4000 spectators were present to participate in or 
witness the unspeakably brutal murder of Hose.40 
As this case makes clear, it was not simply a matter of lack of will on the part of 
government officials to enforce legal protections to which Black men like Hose were 
                                                          
    25. Id. at 5. 
    26. Id. at 12. 
    27. DRAY, supra note 22, at 8. 
    28. Id. 
    29. Id. at 9. 
    30. Id. 
    31. Id. 
    32. DRAY, supra note 22, at 9. 
    33. Id. at 10. 
    34. Id. at 13. 
    35. Id. at 10. 
    36. Id. 
    37. DRAY, supra note 22, at 10. 
    38. Id. 
    39. Id. at 12–13. 
    40. Id. at 13. 
4
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 53 [2017], Iss. 2, Art. 23
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol53/iss2/23
MURPHY, BOOK REVIEW_FINAL (329) (CORRECTED) (DO NOT DELETE) 3/5/2018  10:24 AM 
2018 THE RULE OF LAW AND OBEDIENCE TO LAW 333 
entitled. Citizens can render futile the actions of government officials in defense of the 
rule of law, and Hose’s story makes clear the ways in which this was so. 
To blame citizens alone for murder in cases like Hose’s is to offer an incomplete 
characterization of these cases. This characterization misses the political character and 
purpose of his death. Hose’s death, and the role of citizens in it, was wrong not just because 
a human life was extinguished in a brutal manner, though it was wrong for this reason. It 
was wrong also because it was the demonstration on the part of thousands of citizens of a 
lack of willingness to restrain themselves in the way that law demands when faced with 
an alleged rape of a White woman and killing of a White man by a Black suspect. It was 
wrong because of the manner in which the actions of the sheriff were rendered futile, and 
the meaningfulness of law governing conduct was in fact undermined. This was not an 
ordinary criminal murder; it was political in its purpose and broader in its impact on the 
possibility of respect for law by officials. 
As this case illustrates, law depends on cooperative action and interaction between 
citizens and officials, as well as among officials. Citizens may certainly guard against the 
implementation of unjust rules, as Gowder rightly notes, but through their actions they can 
also impede the enforcement of rules worthy of protection. Such actions are rightly 
deserving of critique from the perspective of the rule of law, a critique that Gowder’s 
account does not provide resources for us to make. 
While I am critical of an assumption underpinning and orienting Gowder’s analysis, 
I am highly impressed by the book as a whole. It provides one of the most comprehensive 
conceptual, normative, empirical, and historical accounts of the rule of law to date. It 
demonstrates why and how these various approaches to the rule of law can and should be 
engaged with each other. And it offers a compelling and original analysis of what the rule 
of law is and why it is of normative value, not only theoretically but also practically. 
 
5
Murphy: The Rule of Law and Obedience to Law
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2017
